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Abstract—	 Engineering privacy in information systems 
requires systematic methods to capture and address privacy 
issues throughout the development process. However, the 
diversity of both privacy and engineering approaches, together 
with the specific context and scope of each project, have spawned 
a plethora of privacy engineering methods. Method engineering 
can help to cope with this landscape, as it allows describing 
existing methods in terms of a limited variety of method elements 
(and eventually enable their recombination into new, customized 
methods). This paper applies method engineering to introduce a 
privacy engineering metamodel, whose applicability is illustrated 
with a set of popular privacy engineering method elements, and a 
widely recognized privacy engineering method. 
Keywords— Privacy engineering metamodel; Method 
engineering; Privacy engineering; Privacy Methods; Methodology; 
Metamodel; ISO/IEC 24744; SEMDM; Privacy by Design; GDPR; 
LINDDUN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increasing urgency in addressing privacy 
concerns associated with information systems, and the 
technical developments available, engineering privacy-friendly 
systems remains a challenge for several reasons. First, privacy 
is a multi-disciplinary, essentially contested concept [1], which 
can thus be subject to multiple reference frameworks, be them 
social, legal, or technical. Second, research efforts have 
focused on tackling privacy issues by technical means, rather 
than investing in generalizing and systematizing the application 
of said technical solutions so that others can reuse and apply 
them. Third, even when a given privacy framework is set, the 
diversity of information systems (platforms, APIs, services, 
infrastructures, enterprise systems…) and development process 
models (agile, waterfall...) makes it difficult to elaborate a one-
size-fits-all privacy engineering method1. 
 In this context, dozens of novel contributions in the field of 
privacy engineering appear every year (of which the papers 
presented at this workshop represent a sample), each of which 
targets specific aspects and suits different situations. In order to 
assess the benefit and adequacy of any such solution, it would 
be desirable to have the relevant knowledge systematically 
organized so as to ease the communication within the 
community of practice and research of privacy engineering.  
                                                            
1 For our purposes, we use both terms ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ 
interchangeably. 
This paper describes our contribution to this effort, by 
presenting a conceptual framework which allows arranging the 
different concepts that usually underlie the various 
contributions subsumed under the field of Privacy Engineering. 
This framework has been realized as a metamodel which 
extends SEMDM (the metamodel for software and systems 
development methodologies described in ISO/IEC 24744 
[ISO24744]), and provides a controlled vocabulary of privacy 
engineering methodological elements and a normalized set of 
connection points and relationships to organize those elements. 
Thus, it enables the description of different elements of existent 
privacy engineering methods in comparable terms, so that they 
can be further catalogued and assessed. That metamodel can be 
thought of as a labelled rack, to each of whose compartments 
the contributions on privacy engineering can be anchored. 
Moreover, by enriching the description of method elements 
with well-defined connection hooks, their reuse and integration 
is fostered.  
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
II provides some background on privacy and method 
engineering. Then, section III describes our proposal for a 
privacy engineering metamodel based on the extension of the 
SEMDM metamodel, and section IV validates its applicability 
by constructing a representation of LINDDUN, a well-known 
privacy engineering method. Finally, section V discusses the 
potential applicability of the metamodel we propose so as to 
promote the reuse of privacy methodologies, and section VI 
concludes by summarizing the significance of our solution and 
pointing towards future work to overcome its limitations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Privacy engineering 
Privacy engineering is a nascent field of research and 
practice which pursues systematic approaches for the inception 
and application of privacy-oriented solutions throughout 
systems and software development processes. According to 
one of the first definitions of privacy engineering [2], the 
keystones of the field are: 
• Theories, which deal with privacy from different 
approaches. For instance, for different authors, privacy 
may be a matter of non-intrusion, seclusion, limitation, 
control, boundary regulation, system architecture, 
policy or interaction, just to mention a few. Following 
that line, we consider that all privacy theories are born 
valid to apply privacy engineering, but different 
theories provide different conceptual frameworks to 
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which the elements of each privacy-engineering 
method adhere. 
• Methods, that is, processes for capturing and 
addressing privacy concerns during any of the stages 
of the lifecycle of information-based systems, which 
include their conception, development, management, 
and maintenance. Methods provide directions and rules 
and help set privacy goals, structured in a systematic 
way into tasks and stages with the aid of supporting 
tools and techniques.  
• Techniques, which refer to procedures, possibly with a 
prescribed language or notation, to accomplish specific 
privacy engineering tasks.2  
• Tools, that is, means (automated or not) that support 
privacy engineers in carrying out their responsibilities 
within a privacy engineering method. 
Efforts on privacy engineering usually stick to the “Privacy 
by Design” (PbD) paradigm [3] which summons engineers and 
other stakeholders to integrate privacy aspects into the different 
activities they are involved, throughout the whole development 
lifecycle of information-based systems, rather than introducing 
them as an afterthought. Several PbD methods have been 
developed which define engineering activities that introduce 
privacy at different stages of the development lifecycle, 
defining what are usually named whole-lifecycle privacy 
methodologies. 
One such effort exemplifies all the concepts described 
above: LINDDUN [4] is a privacy-engineering method focused 
on the privacy assessment of information systems. It 
conceptualizes privacy as seven distinct properties widely 
recognized by the privacy research community, represented by 
its corresponding threats (from whose initials LINDDUN takes 
its name). This method describes a set of techniques to e.g. 
identify privacy threats, and provides a tool called “threat 
catalogue” that supports privacy engineers on this process (v. 
section 4 below for a detailed description of LINDDUN in 
terms of our privacy engineering metamodel). 
Although this conception of privacy engineering seems 
clearly founded, there is no common standard framework 
which privacy engineering developments may refer to. As a 
matter of fact, efforts on standards for privacy have long been 
undertaken by ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27/WG5 (Joint Technical 
Committee 1 of the ISO and the IE, subcommittee 27 on IT 
Security Techniques, working group 5 WG5 on identity 
management and privacy technologies),  which has delivered 
general references that engineers and managers addressing 
privacy must take into account with regards to terminology, 
institutionalization of practice (i.e. ensuring that organizations 
apply the same good practices), and support for evaluation (i.e. 
approaches on how privacy is evaluated). However, those 
efforts only provide partial views of privacy engineering, as 
they deal with individual perspectives (e.g. privacy principles, 
                                                            
2 Note how these Techniques are methodological rather than technological, 
and hence they are different from the “Privacy Enhancing Technologies”, 
which belong to the realm of the technology applied at each endeavor. 
best practices, organizational maturity), isolated processes (e.g. 
impact assessment, requirements analysis), or specific domains 
(Big Data, Internet of Things). Yet they lack a shared, all-
encompassing conceptual framework, independent from 
specific privacy engineering methodologies, development 
practices and application domains. 
It is under these circumstances that we introduce our 
approach, which proposes the definition of such a framework 
where the different privacy engineering methodologies may be 
pegged out, by formalizing the definition of a metamodel 
which consists of the elements that usually appear in privacy 
engineering methodologies and the relationships between one 
another. 
B. Method engineering and SEMDM 
Our approach is grounded in the discipline of method 
engineering, which is [5] “the engineering discipline to design, 
construct and adapt methods, techniques and tools for the 
development of information systems”; and which focuses on 
designing methods (or methodologies) for specific situations 
(e.g. a specific organization, a specific project) rather than 
resorting to rigid, existent methodologies. 
Any methodology that may be constructed responds to an 
underpinning metamodel, i.e. an abstract model that describes 
the concepts that may be present in the methodology (i.e. the 
types of elements it is made of) and their potential relations 
with one another. Many methodologies may exist that conform 
to the same, shared metamodel (i.e. their descriptions can rely 
on a common set of terms). 
One such metamodel is defined by the Software 
Engineering Metamodel for Development Methodologies 
(SEMDM)[7], standardized as ISO/IEC 24744 [8], and “aimed 
to the definition of methodologies in information-based 
domains, i.e. areas characterized by their intensive reliance on 
information management and processing, such as software, 
business or systems engineering.” 
SEMDM proposes three layers of abstraction to define and 
instantiate methodologies: metamodel, methodology and 
endeavor (a.k.a. project). The metamodel defines the elements 
that methods engineers employ to enact methodologies. In turn, 
developers use the methodologies to construct products or 
deliver services in the context of particular endeavors. 
The SEMDM metamodel describes a set of concepts that 
can be part of any methodology, and which cover the three 
dimensions of processes, producers (including people) and 
products: 
• Work Units describe things to be executed, such as a 
Process (large-grained Work Unit that operates within 
a given area of expertise), a Task (a small-grained 
work unit that focuses on what must be done), or a 
Technique (a small-grained work unit that focuses on 
how it has to be done). A methodology may 
recommend using specific techniques for a task, with 
different degrees of Recommendation (e.g. 
compulsory, optional, discouraged, etc.). 
• Producers describe agents that have the responsibility 
to carry out work units, and can be specialized into 
  
Roles (a collection of responsibilities that a producer 
can take), Tools (an instrument that helps another 
producer to execute its responsibilities in an automated 
way) and Teams (a set of producers). 
• Work Products are artefacts of interest for the project 
which can be used as inputs, intermediate results, or 
outputs of a work unit; e.g. Document, Software Item 
or Model. In SEMDM, a Model provides an abstract 
representation of some modelling elements by 
aggregating a set of Model Units, which may be related 
with one another according to the grammar defined in 
a Language. Work products may be acted upon by 
work units through different Actions (read, create, 
modify, or delete). 
• Stages represent a managed time frame with a specific 
objective within a project, either instantaneous such as 
a Milestone, or with duration such as a Phase (during 
which the same cognitive framework prevails), a Build 
(aimed delivering a version of a work product), or a 
Time Cycle (aimed at delivering the final product or 
service). 
A specific methodology (or a method fragment) will define 
its own set of Work Units, Producers, Work Products, or 
Stages (e.g. a method may define a type of Document called 
Requirements Specification to be produced when the method is 
enacted). Each of these elements defined in a methodology 
holds a dual reality: on the one hand, they are instances of the 
concepts defined in the metamodel (e.g. Requirements 
Specification is a kind of Document); on the other one, they are 
Templates that will be instantiated at each endeavor when the 
methodology is enacted (i.e. each project will fulfill its own 
instance of Requirements Specification, according to the said 
Template). The relation between both perspectives is called a 
‘powertype’ relationship. (The interested reader can get further 
details on the use of the powertype pattern for methodology 
metamodeling from [9].) 
SEMDM also defines Resources, that is, methodology 
elements that are used ‘as is’ at the project level, without 
requiring any instantiation, namely: 
• Languages which define a set of Model Unit Kinds 
focused on one modelling perspective, and the 
relations allowed among Model Units of those kinds.  
A Language can be any complex, structured system of 
related symbols able to convey meaning (which 
encompasses the formal languages that underlie 
programming languages, visual languages and natural 
languages alike, but also conceptual languages as in 
‘the language of art’). 
• Notations which are associated to a Language, and 
provide a concrete syntax to represent Models 
conforming to that language. 
• Guidelines which tell how to use some methodology 
elements. 
• Constraints, that is, conditions that hold or must hold 
at certain point in time within the methodology. 
Thus, SEMDM provides a comprehensive and extendable 
metamodel for system and software method engineering. We 
have leveraged these features to develop a comprehensive 
privacy engineering metamodel (detailed in the next section) 
able to cope with the variety in privacy frameworks, business 
domains, types of systems, and development processes. 
III. PRIVACY ENGINEERING METAMODEL 
If privacy engineering promoters want it to be actually 
adopted, they cannot aim at proposing completely new 
methodologies from scratch which are disconnected from 
current practice. Rather, privacy engineering needs to be 
aligned with more general efforts on software and systems 
engineering, in order to ensure a smooth integration and ease 
its application and utility. 
An important step in this direction would be the 
formulation of a conceptual framework that focuses on 
generalizing and systematizing privacy engineering 
methodology elements, so that they can be compared, assessed, 
and integrated. 
Method engineering (and SEMDM in particular) provides 
an especially suitable foundation to model the field of privacy 
engineering. Indeed, the aforementioned definition of privacy 
engineering matches quite well the SEMDM metamodel, as 
both consider the notions of theories, methods, techniques and 
tools; to which SEMDM adds other concepts such as tasks, 
stages, roles, teams and work units, which are also relevant to 
privacy engineering methods, as we will show later. Besides, 
SEMDM addresses both the process and the product 
dimensions, both which are tackled by privacy engineering 
methodologies.  
In consequence, we have built on and extended SEMDM to 
propose a Privacy Engineering Metamodel, by identifying a set 
of extensions to the standard SEMDM metamodel that support 
the concepts specific to privacy engineering. The standard 
SEMDM metamodel together with our extensions can be used 
to describe any privacy-engineering methodology. Of course, 
this can be further extended by specific privacy frameworks 
which refine these concepts or define their own extensions. 
The most relevant extension to SEMDM that allows 
dealing with privacy engineering aspects consists in the 
definition of several types of Resources (in grey, Fig. 1) 
present in many privacy engineering methods, and which 
provide the foundations to deal with privacy engineering from 
different perspectives, namely ontological (Privacy Conceptual 
Model), deontological (Privacy Normative Framework), 
situational (Privacy Engineering Code), and epistemological 
(Privacy Knowledge Base). Besides, an abstract type of role 
(Privacy Engineering Role) subsumes the common 
responsibilities that may be expected from privacy engineers. 
A. Privacy Conceptual Model (PCM) and Units (PCUs) 
A Privacy Conceptual Model (PCM) provides a conceptual 
description of what ‘privacy’ is in the context of the privacy 
theory where a specific privacy-engineering methodology is 
grounded. Due to the plurality [10], contextuality [11], and 
contestability [1] of privacy as a social, political and legal 
concept and its different translations to the technical domain, 
  
we refrain from folding a specific conception of privacy into 
the definition of our Privacy Engineering Metamodel. We do 
however assume that any defendable privacy engineering 
method will draw on some ontological definition of privacy, 
which may in turn influence all the methodology elements. 
Besides providing a definition for privacy, the PCM may 
answer other questions such as what its subject and object are 
(cf. [1]). For instance, ISO 29100 privacy framework [12] 
defines what can be considered as personal information, which 
actors can operate with it and in what interactions they can be 
involved, etc. 
A PCM is often made of Privacy Conceptual Units (PCUs). 
For instance, some models [12] specify privacy into a list of 
privacy principles (fundamental, primary, or general guiding 
rules for the implementation of privacy protections), others 
[13] as a set of privacy harms (problems that a data subject 
may suffer as a consequence of an activity), yet some others 
[14] describe it as a set of technical goals (properties of the 
system-to-be). Note how this partition of the concept of 
privacy into conceptual units is not compulsory, e.g. some 
theories [15] conceive privacy without resorting to such 
partition, —yet all respond to some given conceptual model. 
B. Privacy Normative Framework (PNF) and its components 
A Privacy Normative Framework (PNF) provides 
normative requirements to be applied by all the methods 
claiming to abide by it, and it may include binding regulations 
as well as non-binding, recommended best practices. A PNF is 
composed of three types of prescriptive elements: 
1. Existential Constraints which require (or preclude) the 
existence of specific elements in the methodology 
(specific Tasks, Roles, Work Products, etc.). 
2. Temporal Constraints 3  on the elements of a 
methodology. They are expressed as entry or exit 
conditions on Actions, which must hold at a certain 
point in time (e.g. setting that an Action cannot be 
executed unless the condition is met) —besides they 
                                                            
3 These are simply called Constraints by SEMDM, but we qualify them as 
Temporal to distinguish them from Existential Constraints. 
also affect indirectly the Work Products or Work Units 
from the method. 
3. Privacy Endeavor Requirements (PER) are set on the 
system being developed in an endeavor. While both 
Existential and Temporal Constraints apply to the 
elements of the method itself, these Requirements 
apply to the products created when the method is 
enacted. Although a Requirement Set is typically 
considered one of the Work Products produced during 
an endeavor, in this case we are dealing with high-
level requirements, which are provided by an external 
Resource, to be obeyed ‘as is’ by the system. 
 For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) [16] provides a PNF that requires the existence 
(Existential Constraint) of a Data Protection Officer (DPO) 
Role with specifically allocated Tasks, prescribes that any data-
processing-related Task cannot be performed unless an impact 
assessment Process has been carried out before (Temporal 
Constraint), and mandates a set of Requirements to be met by 
any system dealing with personal information. Note how the 
specific PNF defined by GDPR commits as well to a given 
PCM (viz. a set of principles relating to processing of personal 
data and a set of rights of the data subject), but these are 
different Resources even if referenced by the same source. 
C. Privacy Engineering Code (PEC) 
A Privacy Engineering Code (PEC) refines or clarifies the 
application of the PNF under specific situations or contexts. 
The PEC (sometimes known as ‘code of conduct’ or ‘code of 
practice’) includes a set of Guidelines that document how a 
Constraint or Requirement from the PNF can be applied 
whenever a methodology is enacted on a specific context or 
situation. The PEC may be typically subject to compliance or 
audit checks. For example, Art. 40 of the EU GDPR 
encourages that different institutions draw up codes of conduct 
“…intended to contribute to the proper application of this 
Regulation, taking account of the specific features of the 
various processing sectors and the specific needs of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises.” 
D. Privacy Knowledge Base (PKB) 
A Privacy Knowledge Base (PKB) is a piece of generally 
recognized knowledge that can be reused ‘as is’ in privacy-
 
Fig. 1. Structural meta-model of the SEMDM extensions for the Privacy Engineering Framework 
 
  
engineering endeavors, and whose value and usefulness are 
collectively accepted. In our metamodel, a PKB is described as 
a set of Model Units (instances of some kind of element 
defined in a formal or conceptual Language), but which are 
provided by a methodology as a Resource rather than created 
by each endeavor. An analogy could be the set of standard 
libraries provided by most programming languages alongside 
the language specification itself, which define already 
developed software components to be integrated with others 
developed within an endeavor.  A PKB can be used by 
different types of Work Units defined in the methodology. 
Although privacy engineering is a nascent field, it has 
already developed certain amount of generally recognized 
knowledge, which is gathered in PKBs. For instance, privacy 
patterns [17] provide documented design solutions to  common 
privacy problems in particular contexts.  Privacy patterns can 
be described according to community-agreed templates and 
pattern languages which define the relations among them, and 
gathered together in privacy pattern repositories to be reused 
by privacy engineers. Some other examples of currently 
available PKBs are privacy design strategies [18] and privacy 
threats [19]. 
E. Privacy Engineering Roles (PER) 
Some Privacy Engineering Role (PER) participates in one 
way or another in most privacy engineering methods. It 
represents someone who understands the privacy framework, is 
aware of the privacy engineering methodology elements that 
lead to the development of privacy-enhanced systems, and is 
able to apply them within the endeavor at hand. As such, 
Privacy Engineering Roles are characterized by their 
multidisciplinarity, being savvy in the three of privacy, 
engineering and the domain of the specific endeavor. As stated 
by Cranor [20], “[a] privacy engineer is someone who 
understands the engineering and the privacy sides and works 
out strategies that allow people to protect privacy without 
getting in the way of building cool things.” 
Note that the PER represents an abstract role which shall be 
instantiated by more specific Roles defined by particular 
privacy engineering methods (e.g. Privacy Requirements 
Engineer, etc.), with the specific responsibilities set by the 
methodology. For instance, the Carnegie Mellon University 
M.Sc. In IT - Privacy Engineering enumerates a wide range of 
responsibilities that may be assumed by privacy engineers [21]: 
“[…]develop technical solutions to help mitigate privacy 
vulnerabilities; analyze software designs and implementations 
from a privacy and UX perspective; research, document, and 
help remediate design decisions, operating procedures, or 
processes that may directly or indirectly contribute to future 
privacy risks; create cutting-edge privacy feature prototypes; 
help to lead better on privacy by example; and partner with key 
business, technical and legal stakeholders across various 
business groups to implement Privacy by Design.”  
Besides these Privacy Engineering Roles, any privacy 
engineering method may define additional, concrete roles (and 
their associated responsibilities) that must be considered at the 
methodology level. For instance, the EU GDPR identifies the 
roles of: data protection officer (DPO) with responsibilities in 
the privacy impact assessment, certification body with 
responsibilities in the audit and/or certification process, or 
independent supervisory authorities with responsibilities e.g. in 
the consultation prior to the processing. These roles need not 
represent privacy engineers (as they do not meet the aforesaid 
threefold savvy), yet they are part of the privacy engineering 
method (as they are involved in some of the tasks there 
defined). 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF LINDDUN IN TERMS OF THE PRIVACY 
ENGINEERING METAMODEL. 
For the proposed Privacy Engineering Metamodel to be 
useful, the concepts involved in privacy engineering 
methodologies should be mappable to either SEMDM 
methodology elements or to the extensions that we have 
introduced above. In particular, as a validation of the 
applicability of our metamodel, we have applied it to describe 
the LINDDUN methodology (a well-known privacy-
engineering method) and its main elements, as shown next. 
LINDDUN [4] is a model- and knowledge-based privacy 
engineering methodology aimed at systematically identifying 
the privacy threats in a system and the solutions that mitigate 
them, by following six linear steps, namely: 
1. Define a data flow diagram (DFD), departing from 
either the requirements specification or the system 
architecture, while focusing on the internal data stores 
and the data flows that cross the organization 
boundaries, rather than on the internal processes. 
2. Map privacy threat categories to DFD elements (just 
defined in the step above), according to a predefined 
table that details potential threat categories for each 
type of DFD element; while optionally discarding less 
likely threats, and reducing threats with common 
elements to a single one. 
3. Identify threat scenarios, according to the guidance 
provided by a set of privacy-threat-tree patterns, 
describing threats in terms of misuse cases, and 
documenting any assumptions made. 
4. Prioritize threats, depending on the risk associated to 
each one, according to the results of a risk assessment 
external to this methodology. 
5. Elicit mitigation strategies, according to a taxonomy of 
strategies and a table that maps threat types to 
strategies. 
6. Select Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs), 
constrained by the mitigation strategies just elicited. 
It is not difficult to realize how LINDDUN methodology 
can be modelled in terms of the elements of our Privacy 
Engineering Metamodel (including both native SEMDM 
elements and the extensions we have defined). 
Each of the LINDDUN steps specifies what must be done 
in order to follow the methodology, that is, they define 
different types of Tasks. Besides, most of these steps also detail 
specific procedures to be followed in order to complete the 
respective task, that is, they also define some associated 
Techniques. These techniques are sometimes mandatory (e.g. 
  
TABLE I. METHOD ELEMENTS IN LINDDUN 
Pr
oc
es
se
s Tasks Techniques Work Products Resources 
Task Kind Recom. 
Usage a 
Technique 
Kind 
Action 
Type b 
Work Product Kind c Privacy 
Knowledge 
Base 
El
ic
ita
tio
n 
of
 p
riv
ac
y 
th
re
at
s 
Define data 
flow 
R Create DFD 
from 
requirements 
R System Requirements 
Specification 
 
C Data Flow Diagram  
R Create DFD 
from 
Architecture 
R System Architecture 
Document 
 
C Data Flow Diagram  
Map threats 
to data flow 
elements 
M Use threat 
mapping 
template 
R Data Flow Diagram  
C Threat Mapping 
table 
 
O Discard less 
likely threats 
M Threat Mapping 
Table 
 
O Combine 
threats 
(‘reduction’) 
M Threat Mapping 
Table 
 
Elicit 
privacy 
threats 
M Refine 
threats 
R Threat Mapping 
Table 
 
C Threat List Privacy 
Threat Tree 
Catalogue 
M Document 
assumptions 
C Assumption List  
M Threat List  
M Document 
threats 
R Threat List  
C Misuse Cases  
Se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 m
iti
ga
tin
g 
so
lu
tio
ns
 Prioritize 
threats 
– – R Risk Assessment 
Document 
 
M Threat List  
Elicit 
mitigation 
strategies 
R Map threats 
to strategies 
R Threat List Mitigation 
Strategies  
(Taxonomy 
& Mapping) 
C Mitigation Strategies 
List 
Select 
Privacy- 
Enhancing 
Techniques 
R Map 
strategies to 
solutions 
R Mitigation Strategies 
List 
Privacy-
Enhancing 
Solutions 
Catalogue 
C PETs List 
a. Recommended Usage: M = Mandatory, R = Recommended , O = Optional, D = 
Discouraged, F = Forbidden  
b. Action Type: C= Create, M = Modify, D = Delete, R = Read-only 
c. Work Products in italics are not defined by LINDDUN itself but elsewhere (nonetheless, 
they are used by LINDDUN). 
when threats are elicited, they must be refined using threat tree 
patterns, documented according to a threat description template 
together with any assumptions made), other times they are 
merely recommended (e.g. strategies and solutions should be 
respectively elicited using LINDDUN-provided mappings, but 
these are a mere convenience), and others are optional (e.g. 
DFDs can be created following specific techniques departing 
from specifications or architecture, but other techniques can be 
followed as long as the resulting DFD accurately models the 
data flows in the system). In some cases, LINDDUN does not 
even provide any technique for the respective task, but refers 
the reader to external sources (e.g. threat prioritization depends 
on applying techniques specified elsewhere, in order to 
compute the likelihood and impact of privacy threats). The said 
Tasks are also grouped into two Processes, namely the 
elicitation of privacy threats (which covers the first three steps) 
and the selection of mitigating solutions (the three last). These 
same Processes shall be iterated throughout the development 
cycle. And from the temporal perspective, these LINDDUN 
Processes can be performed during different Phases of a 
software and systems development methodology. Although the 
specific phases shall depend on and align with the development 
methodology employed, LINDDUN authors themselves 
suggest that these Processes can be applied several times 
during the “requirements” (i.e. inception) phase, during the 
“architecture” (i.e. elaboration) phase, or during the 
maintenance phase (on existing systems). 
These Work Units (Tasks, Techniques and Processes) 
produce tangible results, i.e. different types of Work Products. 
More specifically, the DFD is a type of Model (hence the 
description of LINDDUN as “model-based”), whose Model 
Units (viz. external entities, data stores, data flows, and 
processes) respond to a Language and are represented 
(depicted) using a graphical Notation. Likewise, Misuse Cases 
[22] are types of Models employed to describe threats. And 
different types of Documents (the threat mapping table; and the 
lists of threats, assumptions, mitigation strategies and PETs) 
are created by instantiating the respective Templates. Besides, 
Work Products can be not only created, but also modified or 
merely read, e.g. when the outputs of a Work Unit are then 
used as inputs by another one. LINDDUN even allows for 
using Work Products that have been created elsewhere (e.g. the 
requirements specification or the architecture from which the 
DFD can be derived). 
Some of the methodology steps are further supported by 
predefined catalogues of privacy threat trees, mitigation 
strategies and privacy-enhancing solutions. That is, the 
methodology provides three Privacy Knowledge Bases (once 
again, hence the “knowledge-based” feature of the 
methodology). These knowledge bases include each a list of 
atomic components or Model Units (threats, strategies, 
solutions), besides defining the relationships among them. 
These PKBs can be used by any Producer that applies the 
method, in order to simplify the elicitation processes by 
directly including these Model Units as needed, rather than 
coming up ex novo with other threats, strategies and solutions. 
Table 1 (below) models the concepts defined by 
LINDDUN in terms of these method elements (Processes, 
Tasks, Techniques, Work Products and Resources) and 
provides the relations between them. 
All LINDDUN’s methodology elements are influenced by 
its underlying Privacy Conceptual Model, which consists of 
nine privacy properties (that is, Privacy Conceptual Units), viz. 
unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonimity, plausible deniability, 
undetectability, unobservability, confidentiality, awareness, 
and compliance. LINDDUN Privacy Threats are accordingly 
classified into seven categories (after whose initials LINDDUN 
is named), depending on the property respectively 
compromised: Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, 
Detectability, Disclosure of information, user Unawareness, 
and Non-compliance. It is through these categories that the 
influence of the PCM pervades the LINDDUN methodology. 
Thus, the structure of several Templates of Documents and 
Privacy Knowledge Bases in LINDDUN matches these 
  
categories, which guide as well the threat elicitation Process 
that yields the Threat List. The latter is employed to elicit the 
mitigation strategies, which in turn guide the selection of PETs, 
hence both are also indirectly affected by the threat categories. 
V. METHOD REUSABILITY AND INTEGRATION THROUGH THE 
PRIVACY ENGINEERING METAMODEL 
It shall be noted that our Privacy Engineering Metamodel 
does not prescribe that all privacy methodologies incorporate 
all the types of Resources and other elements herein presented. 
Rather, we merely describe those elements which appear 
frequently in privacy methods, so as to offer a common 
theoretical model. What is more, as we discuss in this section, 
and siding with the objectives pledged by method engineering, 
the definition of different methodologies in compatible terms 
might ease the integration of elements or fragments from 
different privacy methods (whether in whole or in part) with 
one another and within generic (i.e. non-privacy-specific) 
software and systems engineering methodologies. Hence a 
specific privacy method may lack some of the metamodel 
elements; however, this should not be considered a drawback, 
but rather a feature, which matches the paradigm of method 
fragment reusability. 
We anticipate that different privacy engineering methods 
will coexist, which respectively suit better the needs of specific 
fields, organizations, endeavors, legislations or technologies 
(i.e. there will not be any overarching method that covers the 
whole of privacy engineering). We assume that engineers may 
be willing to leverage these methods, so as to benefit from their 
usage beyond their initially planned scope, and integrating 
elements picked from different methods. And we posit that the 
definition of privacy methods in terms of the metamodel herein 
presented may ease their reuse and integration. 
Indeed, the declared purpose of method engineering [6] 
consists in enabling the assembly of methodologies from 
method fragments coming from different sources, so as to 
develop new methods that fit better the endeavor at hand. 
SEMDM facilitates this methodological flexibility regarding 
each specific situation, by introducing three distinct layers for 
the metamodel, the methodology and the endeavor. Thus, two 
methods might be more easily integrated as long as they are 
described in compatible terms i.e. drawn from the same 
metamodel (to avoid an apples-and-oranges situation). Yet the 
metamodel not only provides a shared terminology, but also 
defines a series of hooks or extension points where elements 
from both methods can interface with each other. Then, 
departing from existent method parts or elements (e.g. various 
definitions of tasks, techniques, products), a methodologist can 
design new methods through different strategies (e.g. by 
assembling different fragments already available), always 
taking into account the goals that the method under 
construction is expected to fulfill. Therefore, method 
engineering responds to the question of how a method is 
developed in a context where relevance must be given to 
specific domain constraints and goals that the method under 
construction must fulfill (in our case, privacy constraints and 
goals). The answer comes by tailoring the method (rather than 
sticking to a predefined methodology set in stone) and 
selecting appropriate method elements to the specific context 
of each endeavor.  
For instance, and keeping at the LINDDUN example, it 
does not prescribe any Privacy Normative Framework, nor 
does it feature any Privacy Engineering Code. A methodologist 
might anyway integrate LINDDUN with a specific PNF or 
PEC, by introducing the respective Constraints, Requirements 
and Guidelines as new method elements, and evaluating their 
impact in LINDDUN-defined elements. Likewise, it happens 
that LINDDUN is only focused on Work Units and Work 
Products, but it is agnostic regarding the Producers that 
perform and act upon them. Nonetheless, it should not be 
difficult to map elements from other methodologies (e.g. 
analysts, architects, etc.) to Producer ‘placeholders’. 
Furthermore, the Tasks defined by LINDDUN may depend 
on the integration with external methods. For instance, 
LINDDUN prescribes a Task to prioritize threats, which 
depends on the result of a risk assessment Process. However, 
neither does it tell what Technique to employ for that risk 
assessment, nor does it define the Document Template for the 
risk assessment document, leaving both to the implementer’s 
decision. Other sources are available that provide techniques to 
compute a privacy threat likelihood and its impact which can 
be easily introduced, as long as they produce a list of risk 
indices for each threat which can be used for prioritization. 
Moreover, LINDDUN does not even encompass all the 
possible privacy-related Tasks either. It only deals with some 
of them, while leaving out of its scope the creation of privacy 
policies; privacy testing, assessment, and auditing, etc., which 
could be specified by other methodologies. This can be eased 
by mapping LINDDUN Tasks onto different Processes from 
generic development methodologies (e.g. system analysis, risk 
assessment, architecture engineering), and completing the 
absent Processes with Tasks from other privacy-engineering 
methods. 
All in all, LINDDUN elements would need to be integrated 
with elements from other methodologies in order to cover the 
whole development lifecycle, and they should be embedded 
within a mainstream development methodology (e.g. Agile, 
Unified Process, etc.) where privacy aspects would only play a 
limited part. All the intervening methods should be first 
modelled in terms of SEMDM so as to allow connecting their 
elements with one another. And only then, the resulting, 
composed methodology might be applied to new projects. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It will be difficult that privacy engineering succeeds unless 
there is a common, shared understanding of its underlying 
concepts and the relationships between one another. We have 
defined such a common conceptual framework: a Privacy 
Engineering Metamodel  that extends the SEMDM metamodel, 
and which paves the way to reuse and assemble methodologies. 
We have demonstrated the application of our metamodel by 
decomposing LINDDUN into its constituent elements, defined 
in terms of the SEMDM metamodel plus our extensions, and 
suggesting how these elements might be reused and integrated 
with other methodological approaches. 
  
Most relevant concepts for privacy engineering can be 
mapped onto the elements provided by SEMDM, 
supplemented with our extensions. It should be noted that we 
do not claim either the novelty of these additional concepts 
(some of which have long been established in the general 
discipline of Engineering), or its exclusivity to the field of 
privacy engineering (as most can be applied to other categories 
of non-functional requirements as well); but just that we have 
identified them as appropriate to model privacy engineering, 
though they were not available straightaway from SEMDM. In 
fact, these extensions might well be considered as relevant 
contributions in the context of SEMDM itself. 
Despite the proven need, a potential problem of our 
metamodel is the lack of a guarantee of adoption. It may 
happen that some proponents of privacy engineering 
methodologies refrain from recognizing other alternatives 
deemed to be as valid as theirs. We understand that, even if 
they cannot be reconciled, at least they may still agree on a 
common conceptual metamodel. We also plan to refine our 
metamodel by providing more examples of specific Work 
Units, Producers and Work Products, aligned to the 
taxonomies usually employed in the field of method 
engineering (e.g. OPFRO), which demonstrate its applicability 
to further privacy engineering methodologies. 
It may also be the case that our proposed metamodel is only 
adopted within reduced academic circles, and contributes to 
further fragmentation rather than preventing it. That is why we 
aim to submit it to active standardization efforts. It is the case 
that the ISO and the IEC have taken the same challenge as 
well, by recently approving the work item (i.e. launching the 
development of a standard) ISO/IEC AWI 27550 on Privacy 
Engineering. This standard will aim to provide guidelines on 
how to engineer privacy in information systems considering 
different domains and under different development processes. 
We aim at contributing our metamodel to this standard, whose 
creation demonstrates the need to tackle the gap we are dealing 
with. Making it a de jure standard will foster its de facto 
adoption. 
The metamodel we have presented is the result from 
extracting common features from several methodologies we are 
acquainted with. Here we have presented a specific validation 
case that exemplifies it (LINDDUN), but it may be well 
applied to other methodologies. Not only the existence of a 
shared conceptual model is itself key to foster the advance of 
the discipline; but also its modularity allows adapting it to 
specific endeavors or constraints. Rather than aspiring to come 
up with a single catch-all privacy engineering methodology; 
the modularity allows method engineers to create their own 
methodologies. We conjecture that ultimately, if the approach 
we propose succeeds, it will enable the integration of privacy 
engineering methodological elements with one another and 
within mainstream software and system development 
methodologies, and ultimately, will improve the privacy of the 
products or projects developed according to methodologies 
based on our metamodel —which is something yet to be 
proved in practice, so as to demonstrate the utility and 
effectiveness of our approach. In any case, we expect other 
members from the community to discuss the metamodel and 
enrich it with their own contributions. 
It is the case, however, that the rigorous application of 
method engineering principles has been in general limited (e.g. 
to critical systems), and it remains a tool to organize the 
knowledge rather than a practical way to integrate different 
methodologies. Anyway, achieving the same result in the field 
of privacy engineering would still be a success nonetheless. 
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